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The end of the Cold War led to a large drop in world military expenditure, rising
ﬁxed costs of developing weapons because of technological changes and a reduction
of national preference for domestic weapons. Alongside these developments has been
an increase in concentration in the world arms industry, which at the end of the Cold
War had been very unconcentrated with concentration ratios close to the Sutton lower
bound. This paper provides an empirical and theoretical analysis of this process.
It examines the dynamics of the evolution of concentration and then shows that a
trade model with optimal procurement decisions can capture the main features of this
empirical analysis.
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The end of the Cold War saw fundamental changes in the international security envi-
ronment that led to large reductions in military spending worldwide, with important
implications for the international arms industry. At the same time changes in govern-
ment behaviour and attitudes to arms production and changes in weapons technology
were impacting upon the producers. The result was substantial turmoil and restructuring,
the main observable outcome of which was the increase in concentration in the industry.
There is, however, little detailed empirical research on the changes that have taken place
in the industry and no attempts to identify what are the most important factors driving
the process of change.
The changes in military spending involved were certainly substantial. The antago-
nisms of the Cold War had seen military expenditures peak at $1360 billion in the middle
1980s, fall gradually at ﬁrst with improving East-West relations, then fall rapidly with the
disintegration of the Soviet Union to $823 billion (constant 1997 prices). It is estimated
that world military expenditure fell at about 6% per annum in real terms over the decade
1987-97, 7% a year in the developed world and 1% a year in the developing world, with
the most dramatic fall was in the former Soviet Union.1 The arms trade dropped by a
half between the 1987 all time high of $81 billion and the 1994 trough of $42 bn (in 1997
prices), rising to $55bn in 1997. The Asian crisis of 1997 subsequently hit arms sales, since
this was an area where demand had been strong. Procurement of weapons also fell sharply,
with SIPRI (2000) estimating that arms production (domestic demand plus exports minus
imports) in 1997 was 56% of its 1987 level in the US, 77% in France and 90% in the UK.
This decline in the demand for armaments has been associated with an increase in both
concentration and competition in the world arms industry, initially in the US but followed
by the rest of the world.2 The outcome of these processes reﬂected not simply the change
in demand, but also the unique characteristics of the industry, when compared to civil
production, and how these changed over the period. While production for the military
1BVC(2000), previously ACDA, the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
2As SIPRI (2001, p302) comment: “A period of intensive mergers and acquisitions (M&A) began in
the early 1990s. Among large aerospace companies, concentration culminated in 1997-8 in the USA and
in 1999-2000 in Western Europe.”
1is not homogeneous3 major weapons systems are the main products for leading arms
producers and have particular characteristics that have over the years led to particular
corporate structures. They involve high ﬁxed R&D costs ﬁnanced by the governments
and fairly short production runs with steep learning curves (Sandler and Hartley, 1995,
chapter 7). This means that average costs fall sharply with each further unit produced
and so major weapons producers can gain economies of scale and their minimum eﬃcient
scale is large relative to the size of the market. This led to production being concentrated
in relatively few states (Dunne, 1995).4
Traditionally, because the state, which had strong national preferences, was the cus-
tomer, major countries largely relied on their domestic defence industries and while most
manufacturing industries went multinational, the arms industry remained national. Smaller
countries which could not aﬀord the large ﬁxed costs imported major weapons systems.
With the fall in demand, the ability of even the major countries to maintain a domestic
defence industrial base was called into question, making them more willing to import.
As a result domestic and foreign weapons would appear to be regarded as closer substi-
tutes than in the past. This willingness to import has also led to increased competition,
which helps keep down prices and stimulates innovation by ﬁrms and this can clearly be
considered of beneﬁt of governments. There is, however, the problem that the drop in
demand can also drive ﬁrms below their minimum eﬃcient scale.5 In addition, in response
to cost pressures, arms producers have increasingly been using components that are com-
mercial ‘oﬀ-the-shelf’ (COTS) products, produced by manufacturers who would not see
themselves as part of the arms industry, with important implications for the structure of
the industry.6
In this new environment, Governments have also had to decide whether to allow merg-
ers and acquisitions that would reduce competition and in particular whether to allow
3It consists of a whole range of products, from small arms to the large complicated weapon systems, as
well as material that is not directly military.
4In contrast to small arms production, which is relatively standard and widely dispersed.
5This tension between the beneﬁts of scale and the beneﬁts of competition has in fact been the central
defence industrial policy dilemma for the last 40 years. A discussion of the structure at the end of the Cold
War can be found in Smith (1990) a model of the process of competition can be found in Garcia (1999).
6The factors driving up military costs, particularly the ﬁxed costs of R&D, are analysed in Kirkpatrick
(1995).
2mergers and acquisitions that involved foreign partners. The most striking change in in-
dustrial policy was in the US. In 1993 a merger wave was stimulated by the ‘last supper’
when the Pentagon Deputy Secretary Perry told a dinner of defence industry executives
that they were expected to start merging. It ended when the Pentagon decided it had gone
far enough and blocked the merger of Lockheed Martin with Northrop Grumman in early
1997 (Markusen and Costigan, 1999). In Europe the process was more complicated, since
restructuring would involve cross-border mergers, raising political issues, and the major
players had quite diﬀerent ownership structures, including a substantial degree of state
ownership in France. Both factors made a ﬁnancially driven merger boom of the US type
much more diﬃcult. But it is clear that it is the decisions of governments played a vital
role in changing the structure of the industry, and this is a key feature of the theoretical
model we develop below.
Clearly, the changing nature of the international arms market is the result of a number
of factors on both the demand and supply side, interacting in an apparently complex
manner. This paper makes a contribution to developing an understanding of the processes
at work by identifying the most signiﬁcant factors, through a detailed analysis of the
changing structure of the international market, using data on the major international
arms companies and by developing a model consistent with the stylised facts and ﬁndings
of the empirical analysis.
In the next section the evolution of concentration in the defence industry in the period
1990-98 is described. An analysis of the size and growth of ﬁrms is then undertaken
to see whether there has been any systematic change in the size of surviving ﬁrms over
this period. Section 3 then sets out a trade model with optimal procurement decisions,
which is then calibrated using the ﬁndings of the empirical analysis. This calibrated model
then provides a plausible explanation of the observed changes in concentration in terms
of falling demand and rising capital and R&D costs. Section 4 presents some conclusions.
32 Empirical Analysis
2.1 Concentration
With the decline in demand for arms after the Cold War, companies were forced to consider
their corporate strategies. Firms had a choice between ﬁve options on a civil-military axis:
converting their military production facilities to civil production; diversify, by growing or
acquiring civil businesses; divest their defence businesses; cooperate through joint ventures;
or concentrate on defence, acquiring the defence businesses others divested. Apart from
conversion, a route few ﬁrms followed, the other strategies were widely adopted by diﬀerent
ﬁrms.7 The eﬀect of these corporate choices within the constraints imposed by national
governments can be seen in Table 1, which describes the evolution of the industry 1990-
1998. The data set we use is the SIPRI arms company database, described in a data
appendix.
Table 1. The defence industry 1990-1998. Number of ﬁrms, N; Total arms
sales, AS; Inverse Herﬁndahl, IH; Concentration Ratios, 5 ﬁrm C5; 10 ﬁrm,
C10; 20 ﬁrm, C20:
1990 1998
All US nonUS All US nonUS
N 123 51 72 104 39 65
AS 191680 114057 77623 155218 86343 68875
IH 49 24:41 27:3 22 8:8 19:7
C5 22 35 33 41 66 40
C10 36 56 50 55 82 56
C20 55 78 68 70 93 72
Table 1 gives the number of ﬁrms in the sample, their total arms sales and various
measures of concentration. Sales by all the ﬁrms fell by 20% over the period, 24% in the
US and 11% in the rest of the world. The average size of ﬁrm in the sample was relatively
stable at about $2,200m in the US and $1,100 in the rest of the world. This is of course
a changing set of ﬁrms, and Table 2 shows the pattern of entry and exit.
7Smith (2001) discusses the evolution of the industry and the corporate responses in more detail.
4Table 2, Change in number of ﬁrms 1990-1998.
All US nonUS
1990 123 51 72
exits 29 18 11
survivors 94 33 61
entrants 10 6 4
1998 104 39 65
All the measures show increased concentration. The inverse Herﬁndhal can be inter-
preted as an equivalent number of identical ﬁrms and we shall use it for that purpose
below. A convenient standard with which to judge the degree of concentration in the arms
industry is provided by Sutton (1998) who suggests an approach, which does not try to
predict a unique equilibrium for the game or the whole size distribution, but to provide
a lower bound on the concentration that one might observe in the market. It is based on
the assumption that any observed industry is built up from a range of sub-markets. In the
international arms industry the sub-markets are deﬁned by the various types of weapons
from particular countries. He shows that certain basic principles, (e.g. ﬁrms make enough
proﬁts to cover their ﬁxed costs and no viable sub-market will be left unexploited) provide
restrictions on the set of Nash equilibria, and these together with fairly weak conditions
on whether incumbents or entrants will enter a new sub-market opportunity provide a










where ck is the lower bound for the k ﬁrm concentration ratio and n is the total number
of ﬁrms in the sample.
As Table 1 shows the ﬁve largest companies in the SIPRI list accounted for almost
22% of global arms production in 1990. This is very close to Sutton’s independent sub-
market lower bound for the ﬁve ﬁrm concentration ratio given above above, which is 20%.
Similarly the 10 and 20 ﬁrm ratios are close to their lower bounds. At the end of the
Cold War the international arms industry as a whole was not very concentrated. In fact,
concentration in total sales of these companies was higher than in arms sales even though
the commercial markets these ﬁrms were operating in were very diﬀerent. In 1994, the ﬁve
5largest arms ﬁrms accounted for 28% of the total, 1998 41% of the total, in 1999 43% of
the total. This large increase in the share of the top companies is continued further down
the sizes, as shown for the largest 10 and 20 and indeed across the distribution. The sub-
markets were, as one would expect more concentrated, and the increase in concentration
was greater for the US, where more ﬁrms also exited. It seems likely that by its nature
major weapons systems would naturally be a very concentrated market like pharmaceu-
ticals, civil airliners, etc., but that the role of the national governments in attempting to
maintain national defence capabilities has been to inhibit increasing concentration.
2.2 Growth of ﬁrms
To analyse the growth of the surviving ﬁrms, we use the standard equation relating log
arms sales, Ait in year t = 1998 to log size in t ¡ 1 = 1990
lnAit = ¹ + ½lnAit¡1 + "it;
E("it) = 0; E("2
it) = ¾2
":
Gibrat’s law is that ½ = 1 so that growth in size is random. This generates a log-normal
distribution with increasing variance, see for instance Sutton (1997), Dunne and Hughes
(1994) and Hart and Oulton (1996). In 1990 logAi is close to normal, Jarque-Bera tests
have p values of 0.054 for all ﬁrms, 0.199 for US and 0.132 for others. However, by 1998
the distributions are clearly non-normal with p values of 0.000, 0.003 and 0.031 for all,
US, others. As observations for both 1990 and 1998 are needed for this regression only
the companies that survive for the whole period and do not have missing values for the
relevant variable in either year are included8. Assuming that lnAit¡1 is uncorrelated with






8The results are robust to correction for sample selection bias. This is because it is diﬃcult to predict
which ﬁrms exit from this data. The only signiﬁcant diﬀerence is US ﬁrms are more likely to exit. Initial
size is not signiﬁcant predictor for either group.
6Noting that R2 = 1¡(¾2
"=¾2
t); this implies that whether variance is increasing or decreasing








is greater or less than unity. For ½ = 1; this is always greater than unity as long as ¾2
" 6= 0;
the variance does not converge to an equilibrium but continues to increase through time.






Estimates of the equation for the whole sample and for US and non-US ﬁrms are given
in Table 3.
Table 3. Estimates for surviving companies, robust standard errors in
parentheses, standard error of regression and maximised log-likelihood.
N ¹ ½ ¾" R2 MLL
All 94 1:41 0:77 0:67 0:60 ¡94:99
(0:58) (0:09)
US 33 0:04 0:94 0:84 0:60 ¡40:01
(1:11) (0:17)
nonUS 61 1:75 0:73 0:54 0:65 ¡48:16
(0:53) (0:08)
Gibrat’s law ½ = 1 is not rejected in the US sample, though it is in the rest of the
world and the pooled sample, though pooling the two samples is strongly rejected. For the
rest of the world, the estimates indicate that small ﬁrms grow faster than large ﬁrms. The
standard error of regression is substantially larger in the US than the rest of the world. For
the rest of the world the estimates imply an equilibrium standard error of 1.16. However
the estimates for the rest of the world are sensitive to outliers, in particular two small
arms producers (GKN and Celsius) which grew from less than $200m to over $1000m by
acquisition. Excluding the very small ﬁrms with arms sales less than $400m, Gibrat’s law
holds almost exactly for the non-US sample as well as the US sample. This suggests that
7growth of ﬁrms is random9 and that in explaining the evolution of the market, we should
look at features that are particular to the market, that is characteristics of demand, rather
than to features that are particular to individual ﬁrms. In the next section, we provide
a theoretical model of the evolution of the industry which emphasises characteristics of
demand.
3 A Model of Optimal Procurement and Trade
3.1 The Model
This section sets out a model of the global arms market which can capture the main
features discussed in the previous section. We consider a very speciﬁc problem: the
procurement by a military authority from a private military sector given a ﬁxed budget.
We assume away asymmetric information and the need for incentive mechanisms to address
this problem.10
We consider an international market for arms consisting of ` countries where country
1 produces diﬀerentiated goods j = 1;2;¢¢;n1, country 2 produces goods j = n1 + 1;n1 +
2;¢¢;n1 + n2 etc, so there are
P`
i=1 ni = N, say, goods in total. Each variety is produced
by a single ﬁrm. The maximum quality of good j in country i = 1;2;¢¢;` is qij which is the
quality of the procured good. We assume that each ﬁrm can produce a lower quality good
at the same cost and we allow for the possibility that there is an arms export regime in
place that restricts the quality of the imported good by country i to uij · qkj, the quality
procured by country k of variety j = nk¡1 +1;nk¡1 +2;¢¢;nk¡1 +nk. We take this regime
to be exogenously imposed on the military authority making the procurement decisions
and we do not go into details of how this regime can be sustained.
It makes for a simpler presentation if we focus on decisions in country 1. Military
authority 1 procures d1j;j = 1;2;¢¢;n1 domestic goods at quality q1j and imports m1j;j =
n1 + 1;n1 + 2;¢¢;N military goods at quality u1j. The military capability production
function for a particular weapon type in country 1 is assumed to take the form of a
9We tried various other characteristics of ﬁrms at the beginning of the period, e.g. total sales (rather
than just arms sales) and type of product, but none were signiﬁcant.
10Rogerson (1991) discusses incentive mechanisms in a military procurement context.














; ® 2 [¡1;1] (1)
In (1) the weights w1 and 1 ¡ w1, with w1 2 [1
2;1], express the security preferences for
domestic rather than imported procurement in country 1 and 1
1¡® is the elasticity of
substitution between diﬀerent varieties. A variety may be thought of as a type of weapon
produced in a particular country by a single ﬁrm . Countries need a mix of weapons,
hence the demand for variety, but diﬀerent types of weapons can be quite close substitutes
in destructive power. Power projection, as in Kosovo or Afghanistan, can be done by
ground troops, long-range bombers, attack aircraft launched from carriers, cruise missiles
launched from submarines, etc. In (1) there is of course diminishing marginal capability
from increasing any one variety, and this can capture the insecurity associated with over-
dependence on any one supplier. For this exercise, where the emphasis is on the supply
side we are not modelling the determination of M: In addition we are interested in the
global market and we do not attempt to model either the demand for military expenditure
or the decision to have an arms industry.11
The manner in which quality enters into this form of the CES production function can
be related to military operational analysis where the probability of country 1 defeating









where ´; known as the Lanchester (1916) coeﬃcient, depends on the type of combat, see
the discussion in Sandler and Hartley (1995). For dispersed individual duals it is unity,
for battles between massed ranks, it is two. For cases where technological edge translates
directly into victory, it is close to zero. Treating it as unity on average, as is done above
by using qjdj seems a sensible simpliﬁcation.
Let p1j be the price of the procured domestic good and Pj be the price of the traded
good of variety j produced by ﬁrms in all producing countries j = 1;2;¢¢;N. Then the
11These aspects are treated in Levine and Smith (2000).






Pjm1j = G1 (2)
where Gi is military expenditure in country i. Deﬁning Ni by Ni = n1 + n2 + ¢ ¢ ¢ + ni
for i ¸ 1 (in which case N1 = n1 and N` = N), country i = 1;2;¢¢;` produces varieties
j = Ni¡1 + 1;Ni¡1 + 2;¢ ¢ ¢;Ni¡1 + ni = Ni and imports mij units of variety j = 1;2;¢ ¢
¢;Ni¡1;Ni + 1;Ni + 2, ¢ ¢ ¢;N (deﬁning N0 = 0). It follows that the exports of variety





where mij are the imports of variety j by country i. The model is completed by specifying
the following cost structure for the ﬁrm. Firm j produces dj units of variety j for its
domestic government at a price pj and exports xj units at a price Pj. The cost of producing
yj = dj + xj of quality qj is assumed to be
C(yj;qj) = F + fq
¯
j + cyj ; ¯ > 1 (4)
The ﬁrst term in (4) we associate with ﬁxed capital costs other than R&D, the second
term with ﬁxed R&D costs and the ﬁnal term constitutes variable costs.12 It follows that
the proﬁt of this ﬁrm is
¼j = pjdj + Pjxj ¡ C(yj;dj) (5)
and since there is free entry and exit we must impose the participation constraint ¼j ¸ 0
on the procurement decision.
3.2 Optimal Policy in the Single Economy
We ﬁrst consider the optimal decisions of a single military authority taking the decisions of
other military authorities as exogenous. We assume that the arms export control regime
is in force and limits the quality of arms that can be exported by a country to some
12Since there are many ingredients in this model and our main focus is on the endogenous determina-
tion of the number of ﬁrms, R&D is treated here in a rather rudimentary fashion ignoring, for example,
uncertainty. There is a large literature that explores the relationship between R&D intensity and market
concentration. Tischler (2001) is a recent contribution with a useful review of the issues.
10exogenous proportion of the maximum quality available. The sequencing of events is as
follows:
1. Military authority 1 procures domestic goods of quantity d1j and quality q1j at price
p1j for j = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;n1, subject to a non-negative proﬁt participation constraint. To do
this it must allocate its budget between n domestic procurement and imported goods on
the basis of an expected world market price realised in the market equilibrium of the next
stage. However at stage 1 there is only commitment to the domestic procurement decision.
2. In a Bertrand equilibrium of this stage of the game, ﬁrms in producer country i set
world prices Pj for variety j = Ni¡1 + 1;Ni¡1 + 2;¢ ¢ ¢;Ni¡1 + ni, and export quantity xij
at quality ukj · qij to country k 6= i.
3. Since stage 1 involves no commitment to import decisions,13 having set the budget
for imports, G1 ¡
Pn1
mpj=1 p1jd1j, on the basis of the expected equilibrium import price,
military authority 1 may change the particular combination of imports of each good, m1j,
j = n1 + 1;n1 + 2;¢ ¢ ¢;N given their actual (possibly out-of-equilibrium) price Pj and
quality u1j.
To solve for the equilibrium14 we proceed by backward induction starting at:
Stage 3
Given the price Pj, the importing military authority 1 chooses m1j to maximize M1 given
by (1) subject to its budget constraint (2) where the procurement element is given. To












13Notice the dichotomy between the domestic procurement decision which involves commitment and
the import procurement decision where the country does not commit at stage 1 and is a price-taker at
stage 3. If the number of producers is small this might seem problematic unless we add a large fringe of
non-producers who only import. Then each producer country becomes a small player when it comes to the
import decision. For the case on monopolistic competition (see below) the model can be easily modiﬁed
in this way without changing the basic results.
14Note that in the absence of procurement and quality considerations the trade equilibrium corresponds
exactly to the seminal ‘new-trade’ model of Krugman (1979) and the imperfect competition model set out
in Beath and Katsoulacos (1991), chapter 3. Then stage 1 of our model is the free-entry process. With
procurement each military authority by choosing the procurement price, in eﬀect, chooses the number of
domestic ﬁrms.















1j = ¸Pj ; j = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;N (7)









































where ¾ = 1
1¡® > 1. For any country i = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;` import demand for any good














´1¡¾ ; j 6= Ni¡1 + 1; Ni¡1 + 2;¢ ¢ ¢;Ni¡1 + ni
= 0; j = Ni¡1 + 1; Ni¡1 + 2;¢¢;¢;Ni¡1 + ni (11)
Then total demand on the world market for good j is given by
P`
i=2 mij.












Then ˆ Pi = ˜ P1¡¾
i is a quality-adjusted version of the familiar price index of imported goods
by country i used in the product diﬀerentiation literature (see, for example, Beath and
Katsoulacos (1991 chapter 3). Let Gmi = Gi¡
PNi¡1+ni
j=Ni¡1+1 pijdij be the part of the military







15Details of second-order conditions are omitted throughout, but can be shown to hold provided ® < 1,
which we assume, and ¯ >
®
1¡®
12The importance of (13) is that the elasticity of demand for variety j on the world market
with respect to price and quality are constant at elasticities ¡¾ and ¾ ¡ 1 respectively.
Stage2
In country 1 ﬁrm j = 1;2;¢¢;n1 is required by the procuring authority to produce quality
q1j ¸ ukj, the quality exported to country k. Then proﬁt at stage 2 is given by
¼1j = (p1j ¡ c)d1j + (Pj ¡ c)x1j ¡ F ¡ fq
¯
1j ; j = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;n1 (14)





































In working out the eﬀect of a change in the price of variety ﬁrm j considers two eﬀects:
the ﬁrst term takes the total price index of imports facing other countries ˜ Pi ; i = 2;3;¢¢;`
as given. The second strategic term considers the eﬀect on each of these price indices
of the ﬁrms export price. We bypass the complications raised by this term by adopting
the standard assumption of monopolistic competition where there a suﬃcient number of







x1j = 0; j = 1;2;¢ ¢ ¢;n1 (18)
Hence using (15) and imposing symmetry between products from the same country, we
















13(20) for i = 1;2;¢¢;` gives ` equations in ` prices, one for each country. This is the Bertrand
equilibrium at stage 2 of the game in the absence of strategic interaction.
Stage 1
Imposing symmetry between domestic ﬁrms (assumed to be identical), and letting q1j = q1
and d1j = d1 in country 1, its military authority maximizes military capability
M1 =
2









with respect to n1 ¸ 0;d1 and q1 given the world price Pj = c
® of variety j = n1 + 1;n1 +
2;¢ ¢ ¢;N, the numbers of ﬁrms in the rest of the world, n2; n3; ¢¢;n` and two constraints.
These are the budget constraint (BC1) and the representative domestic ﬁrm’s participation
constraint (PC1) given by
BC1 : p1n1d1 +
N X
j=n1+1
Pjm1j = G1 (22)
PC1 : ¼1 = (p1 ¡ c)d1 + (P ¡ c)x1 ¡ F ¡ fq
¯
1 ¸ 0 (23)
where we have put P1 = P2 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = Pn1 = P in country 1. Clearly the PC constraint
must bind so the procurement price is given by
p1 = c +
F + fq
¯






where we have written export revenue (P ¡c)x1 = R(x1) and total ﬁxed production costs
as H(q1) = F + fq
¯
1. It is convenient to eliminate the PC constraint by substituting for
p1 in the BC1 constraint. This now becomes
BC1 : n1(cd1 + H(q1) ¡ R(x1)) +
N X
j=n1+1
Pjm1j = G1 (25)
and the military authority now maximizes M1 given by (1) with respect to n1;d1 and
q1 given (25) , P, n2;n3;¢ ¢ ¢;n` and d2;d3;¢¢;d`. Notice that exports x1 depends only on
d2;d3;¢¢¢;d`, q1 and Pj (which we will conﬁrm). To carry out this constrained optimization,
deﬁne a Lagrangian
L = M1 ¡ ¸[n1(cd1 + H(q1) ¡ R(x1)) +
N X
j=n1+1
Pjm1j ¡ G1] (26)












1 ¡ ¸c = 0 (28)
m1j : M1¡®
1 (1 ¡ w1)m®¡1
1j u®













These 4 equations plus the constraint BC1 solve for n1; d1; m1j, ¸ and q1. Dividing













; j = n1 + 1;¢ ¢ ¢;N (32)
cd1 = ¯fq
¯
1 ¡ (¾ ¡ 1)(P ¡ c)x1 (33)
Notice that from (32) , the ﬁrst-order condition arising from the BC1 constraint, the












which, from (11) agrees with the decision taken at stage 3. Thus the anticipated optimal
mix at stage 1 is actually implemented at stage 3, a condition for the subgame-perfectness
of the equilibrium. In (32) the quality u1j is that imposed by the country producing
variety j; We assume that imports from country k have quality °kqk where °k · 1 indicates






















using Pj = P = c
®. Then m1j = Á1jd1. Similarly for country i imports of variety j are











where uij is the quality allowed to country i by the producer of variety j. Notice that since
uij · qij, ¾ > 1 and wi ¸ 1
2 it follows that Áij < ® < 1. To complete the solution we note








From (24) and (31) given the procurement price can now be written











completes the solution for the single economy given the decisions on di and qi by the other
countries.
3.3 The Symmetric Non-Cooperative Equilibrium
We now solve for a symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium in which d1 = d2 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = d,
°1 = °2 = ¢ ¢ ¢ = °,and other variables are deﬁned similarly. Then x1 = x = (` ¡ 1)Ád,
N = `n. Substituting R = (P ¡ c)x we arrive at the symmetric equilibrium:
d =
®¯F








[¯(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®] (40)
q =
·















It follows from (40) and (42) that the total output per ﬁrm or its ‘size’ is given by
y = d + x where
y =
®¯F
c[¯(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®]
(43)
3.4 The Ramsey-Optimum and the Closed Economy
If countries coordinate in their choice of ni and di and relax export controls, then they
can reach the optimum (subject to a participation constraint for each ﬁrm), referred to in
16the literature as the ‘Ramsey-optimum’ (RO)16. If we continue to consider a symmetric
outcome then the Ramsey-optimum is found by maximizing
M = [wn(qd)® + (1 ¡ w)(N ¡ n)(uÁd)®]
1
® (44)
where N = n`, u = q subject to the budget and participation constraints
[p + P(` ¡ 1)Á]nd = G (45)
(p ¡ c)d + R(x) ¡ H(q) = 0 (46)
where as for the symmetric non-cooperative equilibrium above, R(x) = (P ¡ c)x = (P ¡
c)m = (P ¡ c)Ád and we recall the deﬁnition H(q) = F + fq¯. Thus we can rewrite (44)
and (46) as
M = [(w + (1 ¡ w)(` ¡ 1)Á®)n]
1
®qd (47)
[p + P(` ¡ 1)Á ¡ c(1 + (` ¡ 1)Á]d ¡ H(q) = 0 (48)
This optimization problem is equivalent to that of the closed economy with a procurement
price p+P(`¡1)Á and and marginal cost c(1+(`¡1)Á). Eliminating p+P(`¡1)Á from
(45) and d from (46) the problem reduces to the unconstrained maximization of M with
respect to n and q. It is straightforward to show that this leads to the following solution
dRO =
®¯F





[¯(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®] (50)
qRO =
·















Thus comparing these and previous results we immediately see that the Ramsey-optimum
and the non-cooperative non-strategic equilibrium are the same. To summarise:
16This is not the social optimum for two reasons: ﬁrst, we cannot equate military capability with welfare.
Second, military capability is optimal where price equals marginal cost. Then, to ﬁnance ﬁxed costs, ﬁrms
would need to be subsidised. This raises issues associated with distortionary taxes which lie outside the
scope of this paper.
17Proposition 1
The non-cooperative non-strategic equilibrium and the Ramsey-optimum coin-
cide so there are no beneﬁts from coordination in the choice of market struc-
ture and quality. In the closed-economy equilibrium ﬁrm size and number,
and the quality of each variety is as for the non-cooperative equilibrium and
Ramsey optimum.
3.5 Comparative Statics






changes in the arms export parameter ° 2 (0;1] and/or the preference parameter w. An
increase in ‘openness’ is associated with a relaxation of arms export controls (a rise in °)
and /or a lower priority for domestic procurement (a fall in w) thus causing Á to rise. It
is immediately apparent that dd
dÁ < 0 and dm
dÁ > 0. Otherwise the number of ﬁrms, the
quality of output and the total size of the industry are independent of Á and therefore
those factors aﬀecting openness. To summarise:
Proposition 2
In a symmetric non-strategic equilibrium the only eﬀect of an increase in ‘open-
ness’ is to shift military expenditure from domestic to imported procurement.
The number of ﬁrms, the size of the average ﬁrm and quality are independent
of openness. The procurement price equals the world price.
The other parameters of interest are G=F, F=c, F=f, ¯ and ®. Clearly the number of





F¯2 > 0 (53)
and so n falls as ¯ falls. From (41) , as ® rises and ¯ falls then the quality rises. The total
size of the ﬁrm is given by (43) and is independent of G, rises as ® rises and ¯ falls. We
summarise these results in our ﬁnal proposition:
Proposition 3
In both the non-cooperative equilibrium and the closed economy, the number
of ﬁrms falls if total military expenditure G falls, F rises, military goods become
more homogeneous (® ! 1) and the quality cost parameter ¯ falls. The latter
18three changes are associated with a rise in the size of the ﬁrm and a rise in
quality, but changes in G do not aﬀect ﬁrm size and quality.
These results for our stylized symmetric model reproduce the main empirical features
of the defence in the defence industry set out in the previous section. The most obvious
exogenous change to the industry is the fall in military expenditure G. In our procure-
ment and trade equilibrium each government responds to such a change by concentrating
production in fewer ﬁrms that remain of the same size. Quality is unaﬀected but military
capability falls because product diversity falls. Globalisation in the form of a change in
openness does not in itself aﬀect market structure, but only brings about a switch be-
tween domestic and imported procurement. A rise in the parameters aﬀecting the cost of
quality, ¯ and f=c not surprisingly leads to a drop in quality. Less obvious is the eﬀect of
changes in ¯ and the substitutability parameter ® on quality, and ﬁrm size and number,
as described in proposition 3. The basic intuition here is that quality and diversity are
substitutes providing military capability in diﬀerent ways. Faced with an decrease in ¯
the policymaker trades oﬀ a increase in quality with an decrease in diversity concentrat-
ing production in fewer production units of a greater size. Finally as ® rises then goods
become close substitutes and the beneﬁts of diversity fall. The optimal response is then to
reduce diversity and concentrate production in fewer units of a larger size. The fact that
average size has not changed for either the US or the rest of the world implies that any
changes to these various parameter that aﬀect size were either small or that they tended
to cancel each other out. Our calibration below suggests the latter: ® seems to have fallen
substantially, as has ¯. The ﬁrst of these changes would decrease ﬁrm size, the second
increases it, so the eﬀects do seem to cancel.
Although the model is very abstract it allows us to analyse the relationship between the
relevant set of variables: total demand, ﬁxed costs, the eﬀectiveness of R&D, competition
and concentration. However it is important to be aware of what the model does not do.
Firstly, in this model ﬁrms do not behave strategically, thus the increase in concentration
and competition is not driven by the strategic behaviour of ﬁrms. This is quite unlike
the case of telephone switches analysed in Sutton (1998, ch5). Normally in high R&D
industries one would expect ¯ to be low: because the extra quality obtained per unit of
R&D is high, it is proﬁtable to invest in R&D. But this applies to R&D done by ﬁrms
19to give them a competitive advantage over other ﬁrms. In the arms industry R&D is
chosen by governments to give them a military advantage over their adversaries. Even
if ¯ is large, so that the last 1% of performance enhancement is very expensive, that
slight quality advantage may be worth having in combat.This makes defence a high R&D
industry with high ¯.17 Secondly, the model does not explain the industrial dynamics
associated with the rise in concentration, e.g. the process of mergers and acquisitions. We
have assumed each ﬁrm produces a single variety. In practice, ﬁrms may produce more
than one variety and there may be economies of scope.
3.6 Calibration of the Model
In this subsection we treat the US as an approximately closed economy and the rest of
the world’s main exporters as a second bloc of economies open to each other, but closed
to the rest of the world. The model generates a number of equally sized ﬁrms rather than
the highly skewed distribution observed in practice. However we can calibrate the model
using the inverse Herﬁndahl given in table 1, which can be given the interpretation of the
number of equivalent ﬁrms in the market. This fell from 24 in 1990 to 9 in 1998 in the US
and from 27 to 20 in the rest of the world. We can calibrate on these numbers of ﬁrms
and the ﬁgures for total sales in table 1. Suppose we have G falling from 115000 to 85000
in the US (both measured in millions of 1995 dollars), and from 78000 to 69000 in the
rest of the world. We also use R&D data for the US which rose from 32% to 43% of total
weapons procurement costs in the US over that period and for the UK (which we take
as representative of the main producers in the rest of the world) which rose from 21% to
22%, SIPRI (2001)18.
We exploit the relationship giving the number of ﬁrms, (40). In addition from the
binding participation constraint we have that revenue equals total costs; P(d + x) = Py
where we recall that d =domestic procurement, x =exports and y = d+x=output, all per
ﬁrm. In equilibrium the procurement price equals the international market price P = c
®
where c =marginal cost (equals average production cost given our assumption of constant
17Kirkpatrick (1995) discusses this in more detail.
18In 1998 the US spent 15% of total military expenditure, which includes other costs than procurement,
on R&D, the UK 10%, France 9%, Germany 5%, thus the UK is rather higher than the other countries.
However, this higher ratio may be more typical of the major weapons systems we are interested in.




y = Total Costs(TC) = F + fq¯ + cy (54)
where q is is quality. In (54) let us associate the second quality component of total costs
with R&D, the third with variable cost leaving F as ﬁxed capital cost. Denote the shares







= ® = °V (55)
For each bloc as a whole, in a symmetric equilibrium
G = nPy = nTC (56)




[¯(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®] (57)





Since we have only have data on R&D, we must make an additional assumption: at
the beginning of the period in question (1990) we assume that variable and ﬁxed capital
costs are divided in the usual proportions of labour and capital; i.e., 7 : 3. Then variable
and ﬁxed capital costs as proportions of total costs are given by19
°V = 0:7(1 ¡ °R); °F = 0:3(1 ¡ °R) (59)
To summarise, given observations n = ˆ n, G = ˆ G and R&D shares in total costs ˆ °F, ˆ °V and
ˆ °R respectively, our calibrated values for ®, ¯, °F and F at the beginning of the period in
1990 are given by:








[¯(1 ¡ ®) ¡ ®] (60)
19We need to check the second order condition ¯ +1 > ¾ =
1







1¡°V ; i.e., °R < 1¡°V . But °R = 1¡°V ¡°F < 1¡°V , so the
second order condition is satisﬁed with this calibration.
21For the US in 1990 this gives us calibrated values ® = °V = 0:476, ¯ = 1:49 and °F =
0:204. For the rest of the world the corresponding values are: ® = °V = 0:553, ¯ = 2:63
and °F = 0:237. These estimates suggest that the US could increase quality at less cost
than the rest of the world. This is not implausible if there are learning curves or increasing
returns to scale in R&D.
Can our model now provide a plausible explanation for the fall in ﬁrms numbers over
the period? From (56) with P = c







Thus we can explain the fall in numbers by some combination of a fall in ® = °V , total
spending, and an increase in marginal cost and size. Our empirical analysis of concen-
tration and the growth of ﬁrms suggest there has been no systematic increase in the size
of ﬁrms (i.e., y90 = y98). If we rule out an increase in marginal cost (i.e., c90 = c98)
then this leaves only two explanations: G has fallen (as observed) and ﬁxed plus R&D
costs as a proportion of total costs has increased (as partly observed). The implied changes
over the period in variable and ﬁxed costs as a proportion of total costs are summarised as:
Country Implied Change in ® = °V Implied Change in °F
US 0.48 (1990); 0.24 (1998) 0.20(1990) 0.33(1998)
RoW 0.55 (1990); 0.44 (1998) 0.24(1990) 0.34 (1998)
This would explain the reduction in the number of ﬁrms in terms of a drop in demand,
G, and a shift in total costs from variable to ﬁxed, in both the US and the rest of the world.
However it is probable that the industry, particularly in the rest of the world had not yet
reached the equilibrium concentration in 1998, as we have assumed here. There is also an
irreversibility that leads to asymmetry, which we have not modelled. If a country, chooses
to import and loses the capability to produce a particular major weapon system, then
it is very expensive to re-acquire the capability. Increases in concentration can become
irreversible. It seems unlikely that the US defence budget increases announced in 2002
will reverse the growth in concentration.
224 Conclusions
With the end of the Cold War the international arms industry was confronted by a massive
reduction in demand for its products. This was also happening at a time when technology
and government attitudes towards domestic production and ownership were already lead-
ing to changes in the supply side. This led to an increase in R&D as a proportion of total
production costs within the companies, as companies responded to technological imper-
atives and contracted out component production to reduce costs. Analysing the data on
the major arms producers shows clearly that at the end of the Cold War, the international
arms industry was relatively unconcentrated by comparison with comparable high tech-
nology industries like commercial aerospace or pharmaceuticals. In fact it was quite close
to the Sutton lower bound, a clear legacy of government’s historical support for domes-
tic arms production in the major powers. It is, therefore, no surprise that concentration
increased markedly 1990-98, but what is interesting is that this was not associated with
increases in the average size of ﬁrms and that there should be no evidence of any tendency
for large ﬁrms to grow faster.
In an attempt to determine the fundamentals of this process a trade model with op-
timal procurement decisions was constructed. This model predicted that concentration
will increase with a decline in the total size of the market, increased ﬁxed capital costs,
and increased R&D costs and be associated with fewer ﬁrms of the same size. These are
all characteristic of the post Cold War period. Concentration did increase with the ﬁve
ﬁrm concentration ratio raising from just over 20% to over 40%. However, most of the
concentration happened in the largest market, the US. Our analysis points to two oppo-
site eﬀects of increased concentration on competition. On the one hand the willingness
of governments to procure from abroad means that although this does not alter world
concentration (see proposition 2), ﬁrms no longer sell in a sheltered domestic market and
competition increases. However this pro-competitive eﬀect is oﬀset by an decrease in the
elasticity of substitution between varieties. This in turns increases the market power of
each ﬁrm producing its own diﬀerentiated product.20 Despite the turmoil, the industry
20This conclusion and proposition 2 in particular needs to be treated with caution for two reasons.
First, we ignore strategic pricing in the Bertrand equilibrium. This becomes increasingly important as
concentration increases. Second, in our standard Dixit-Stiglitz CES military capability function, taste for
23is still not very concentrated by comparison with other comparable industries and it is
probable that concentration has not yet reached its equilibrium level, particularly outside
the US. This may raise political problems for countries concerned to protect their defence
industrial bases. It is also possible that because of asymmetries the increases in military
expenditure, which have recently been announced by some countries, will not reverse the
trend to increased concentration.
Overall, the paper has provided a detailed understanding of the changes that have
been taking place in the post Cold War arms industry. It has also provided a model of
government behaviour which drives this market and goes some way to explaining the most
important factors determining the changing structure of the international arms industry.
The model provides a valuable starting point, but leaves a number of unanswered ques-
tions. These include explaining the skewed distribution of ﬁrm sizes and the ﬁrms choices
about mergers and acquisitions, when permitted by the government, are not explained.
Future research needs to consider the ﬁrm dynamics, develop the theoretical work on mar-
ket structure and procurement and the inﬂuence of technological change on the military
capability function. These are all subjects under investigation.
Data Appendix
The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) have collected informa-
tion on arms sales, total sales, proﬁts and employment for the 100 largest arms-producing
companies since 1988 and published it annually in their yearbook. We use 1990 as our
starting year. Having data on total sales is a useful control, since arms producers tend
to be the defence divisions of diversiﬁed ﬁrms. SIPRI send questionnaires to companies
asking them for the information. In the case of the share of arms in total sales, companies
may be unwilling to disclose this and in such cases SIPRI uses estimates constructed with
the assistance of a network of country experts. Where a company enters the top 100, they
will go back and try to collect data for earlier years, so we have some observations on
variety is linked one-for-one with the elasticity of subsitution. See Benassy (1996) for a discussion of this
and a more general production function which disentangles these eﬀects. Dunne et al (2002), generalises
the model of this paper using this form of CES production function and including strategic eﬀects. Then
the the optimal choice of concentration by countries acting independently is below the Ramsey optimal,
and increasing openness encourages this beggar-thy-neighbour choice of ﬁrm number, providing a further
factor to explain the increase in world concentration.
24companies ranked below 100. The deﬁnition of arms is not straightforward and does not
match sales to defence ministries, the other main source of data. For instance, defence
ministries spend large parts of their budgets on fuel and food, which would not count
as arms. There may also be elements of double counting since some of the sales are of
components or munitions to other companies. This is not a problem for the measurement
of concentration but is a problem in using the total sales of these companies as a measure
of the volume of arms supplied.
Looking at the top 100 makes the sample endogenous and there can be missing data
for companies who are in the top 100 for a couple of years, dropping out and then re-
entering. The measures of concentration in each year are probably reasonably accurate,
because most of the inaccuracies are for the smaller ﬁrms and this will probably not in-
ﬂuence concentration measures very much. The major problems arise for any dynamic
analysis, since this requires some treatment mergers and acquisitions, which are a central
feature of this industry. Consider the case of Lockheed-Martin, the product of the merger
of Lockheed and Martin Marietta. This could be treated by assuming Lockheed continued
Martin-Marietta exited; Lockheed exited Martin-Marietta continued; both exited and a
new ﬁrm Lockheed-Martin entered. Analysis of entry-exit and Gibrat regressions will be
sensitive to this treatment. Name change is not conclusive. Thales and BAE Systems, de-
spite the name changes are clearly continuations of Tompson-CSF and British Aerospace.
Using standard data, it might be reasonable to assume that the larger ﬁrm acquired the
smaller ﬁrm, even though the reverse does happen. In the case of our data, this is not
straightforward since it is not clear whether we should judge size by total sales or arms
sales. For instance, should EADS should be treated as a continuation of Aersopatiale
(arms sales $3,300m total sales $13,743) or Daimler Chrysler (arms sales $3,040 total sales
$160,000m)? Having a large new company suddenly appear in the data, makes entry look
too easy, but providing a history by allocating the merged company to a predecessor will
inevitably be arbitrary. Similar problems arise when a company spins oﬀ one of its defence
divisions.
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